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ABSTRACT
We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the
collusion channel are unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host
sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated
copies to the colluders.
Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a se-
quence of maximin games with mutual information as their payoff functions.
However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are
very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking
assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person
zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution.
If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprinting alphabet is binary,
we show that the capacity is in Θ(1/k2). Furthermore, we prove rigorously
that the asymptotic capacity is 1/(k22 ln 2) and we confirm our earlier conjec-
ture that Tardos’ choice of the arcsine distribution asymptotically maximizes
the mutual information payoff function while the interleaving attack mini-
mizes it. Along with the asymptotic behavior, numerical solutions to the
game for small k are also presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In view of the ubiquity of digital media and the development of sophisticated
piracy tools, it has become essential to develop a reliable protection scheme
for copyrighted content. Digital fingerprinting, in which the content distrib-
utor embeds a uniquely identified fingerprint into each distributed copy, is
an effective way to prevent unauthorized redistribution of the content.
Hundreds of years ago, people used the idea of fingerprinting in logarithm
tables. Errors were added intentionally to insignificant bits of random values,
with each copy having a unique set of modifications. If someone ever sold his
copy illegally, the legal authority could easily trace the guilty owner (pirate)
by looking into the small errors.
Digital content (e.g., images, videos, audios, programs, etc.) can be pro-
tected using the same idea. One common approach is to embed fingerprints
using digital watermarking techniques. Similar to the logarithm tables dis-
cussed above, the fingerprints should not impair the quality or the function-
ality of the contents. Most watermarking systems are even robust against at-
tacks such as compression, digital-to-analog conversions, or intentional noise
adding.
The most dangerous attack against fingerprinting, however, is a collusion
attack. A group of experienced pirates can form a coalition, detect the fin-
gerprints by inspecting the marks in each copy, and create a forgery that
has only weak traces of their fingerprints. For the logarithm table example,
if the errors are sparse and chosen randomly, the coalition can easily correct
these errors by comparing several different copies of the logarithm table. No-
tice that since the pirates cannot remove the errors in which all their copies
coincide, it is still possible for the distributor to design the marks so that at
least one of the pirates can be caught (with, of course, certain risk of falsely
accusing someone). Yet it should be apparent that if the size of coalition is
large, it is very hard to trace back to the fingerprinted copies from which the
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forgery was generated.
Many collusion-resistant fingerprinting techniques have been studied re-
cently. For fingerprinting on multimedia content, one often employs the
distortion constraint [1, 2, 3, 4]. In this work, however, we adopt another
setup introduced by Boneh and Shaw in [5], called the marking assumption,
which is commonly used in document and software fingerprinting. Under
this assumption, fingerprints are a string of marks allocated throughout the
host content, just like the errors in the logarithm table. The locations of the
marks are assumed unknown to the pirates. By comparing their available
copies, the coalition can remove or replace the detected marks, but cannot
modify those marks at which their copies agree. As a result, we can ignore
the host sequence and consider only the fingerprints in our analysis under
this assumption.
1.1 Previous Work
One of the first designs of fingerprinting codes that are resistant to collusion
attacks is presented by Boneh and Shaw [5]. It was shown in [5] that a
deterministic binary fingerprinting code with zero probability of decoding
error does not exist. Hence, it becomes necessary for the construction of the
fingerprinting codes to use some form of randomization, where the random
key is shared only between the encoder and the decoder. They also provided
the first example of codes with vanishing error probability.
Tardos in 2003 [6] constructed fingerprinting codes of length at most
100k2 ln(m/) for m users with error probability at most  against k pi-
rates. This construction yields k-secure fingerprinting schemes of rate
(k2100 ln 2)−1. The same paper gave an Ω(k2 log(1/)) bound on the length
of any fingerprinting code with the above parameters. The constant 100
in the length 100k2 ln(m/) was subsequently improved by several papers
[7, 8, 9, 10]. Amiri and Tardos recently [11] further improved the rate by
constructing a code based on a two-person zero-sum game.
A few researchers have also studied the problem from the information-
theoretic point of view [1, 4, 12, 11]. Here the main objective is to find the
maximum achievable rate, or capacity, of the fingerprinting system. We de-
note capacity by Ck where k is the maximum coalition size. For the binary
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alpahbet, Tardos’ construction suggested that Ck ≥ (k2100 ln 2)−1. Antha-
padmanabhan et al. [12] proved that Ck = O(1/k). Recently, Moulin [4]
provided the exact formula of capacity in a general setup that unifies the
signal-distortion and Boneh-Shaw formulations of fingerprinting. The for-
mula can be regarded as the limit value of a sequence of maximin games,
which, however, is extremely difficult to evaluate in general.
Two families of fingerprinting decoding scheme are also introduced in [4]:
simple decoding and joint decoding. The breakthrough of Tardos’ random-
ized fingerprinting code in [6] and its subsequent works belong to the class
of simple decoders. It falls short of the capacity-achieving goal: reliable per-
formance is impossible at code rates greater than some value Csimple that is
strictly less than capacity. Yet the simple and efficient algorithm makes it
desirable for practical use. On the other hand, Amiri and Tardos’ recent work
[11] belonged to the joint decoding scheme. Although capacity-achieving, it is
much more complex than the simple decoding scheme and is only useful when
computation is not an issue. Another example of joint decoding is Dumer’s
work in [13], where additional constraints are imposed in the analysis.
1.2 Main Results
Our work follows the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption. For both joint
and simple decoding, we reformulate the maximum achievable rates of both
schemes as the respective maximin values of two two-person zero-sum games.
We further show that the maximin and minimax values of the games are al-
ways equal, and the values are achieved by saddle-point solutions.
In the binary alphabet case, new capacity bounds are provided. The ratio
between the upper and lower bounds of the joint decoding scheme is pi2/2,
while that of the simple decoding scheme is only pi2/4 (for large k). These
bounds not only show that the binary fingerprinting capacity is in Θ(1/k2),
but they also provide secure strategies for both players of the game. Numer-
ical solutions for small k are also presented in comparison with the bounds.
Asymptotic analysis for large coalitions is based on a mild continuity as-
sumption. When k is large, the fingerprinting game of joint decoding approx-
imates a continuous-kernel game, whose optimal-achieving strategies can be
solved explicitly as the arcsine distribution and the interleaving attack. A
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statistical justification is provided for this result.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Chapter 2, we introduce our fin-
gerprinting model and formally define fingerprinting capacity. The capacity
formula derived in [4] is briefly reviewed and reformulated to a single finger-
printing game in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 is devoted to the binary alphabet
case and Chapter 5 gives a brief summary.
1.3 Notation
We use capital letters to represent random variables, and lowercase letters to
their realizations. Boldface denotes vectors, and calligraphic letters denote
finite sets. For example, X ∈ X n denotes a random vector (X1, . . . , Xn), with
each Xi taking values in X . The probability distribution of X is characterized
by its distribution function PX(x) , Pr(X1 ≤ x1, . . . , Xn ≤ xn). If the
distribution is discrete, we also describe it by its probability mass function
(pmf) pX(x) , Pr(X = x). Otherwise if PX has the form
PX(x) =
∫ x1
−∞
· · ·
∫ xn
−∞
fX(x)dx1 . . . dxn
then we characterize the distribution by its probability density function (pdf)
fX. Mathematical expectation of a function g(X) with respect to PX is
defined by
EPX [(g(X)] ,
∫
g(x)P (dx).
The Kullback-Leibler divergence between two pmf’s p and q is denoted
by D(p ‖ q). The mutual information of X and Y is denoted by I(X;Y ),
and the empirical mutual information of a pair of sequences (x,y) is de-
noted by I(x; y). We also denote the binary entropy function by h(p) ,
−p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) and h(p) = (h2(p1), . . . , h2(pn))′. The KL diver-
gence between two Bernoulli random variables with respective expectations
p and q is denoted by d(p‖q) , p log p
q
+ (1 − p) log 1−p
1−q , where log denotes
base 2 logarithm and ln denotes natural logarithm throughout the thesis.
The size or cardinality of a set A is denoted by |A|. The indicator function
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of a subset A of a set X is a function
1A : X → {0, 1}
defined as
1A(x) =
{
1 if x ∈ A
0 if x /∈ A .
The power set of a finite set X , denoted by 2X , is the set of all subsets
of X , including the empty set and X itself. The support of a probability
distribution P , denoted by supp(P ), is the smallest set whose complement
has probability zero. The support of a family P of probability distribu-
tions, denoted by supp(P), is the union of the support of each probability
distribution in the family, i.e.
⋃
P∈P supp(P ).
Asymptotic notations are defined as follows: Suppose f(k) and g(k) are
two functions defined on positive real numbers. We say f(k) = O(g(k)) if
∃c1 > 0, k1 > 0 such that f(k) ≤ c1g(k),∀k ≥ k1. Also, f(k) = Ω(g(k)) if
∃c2 > 0, k2 > 0 such that f(k) ≥ c2g(k),∀k ≥ k2. We write f(k) = Θ(g(k))
if f(k) = O(g(k)) and f(k) = Ω(g(k)). The expression f(k) = o(g(k)) or
f(k) = ω(g(k)) means that f(k)/g(k) tends to 0 or ∞ respectively. The
shorthand f ∼ g, f & g, and f . g denote the asymptotic relations
limk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
= 1, lim infk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
≥ 1, and lim supk→∞
f(k)
g(k)
≤ 1 respec-
tively.
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CHAPTER 2
FINGERPRINTING CODES AND
CAPACITY
2.1 Overview
The model for our fingerprinting system is shown in Figure 2.1. Let X =
{0, 1, . . . , q−1} denote a size-q fingerprint alphabet and letM = {1, . . . ,m}
denote the set of user indices. An (n,m) fingerprinting code (en, dn) over X
consists of an encoder and a decoder. The encoder
en :M×Vn → X n (2.1)
assigns user i a length-n fingerprint Xi, where Vn is the alphabet of the secret
key Vn, which is a random variable whose realization is known to the encoder
and the decoder, but unknown to the pirates.
K , {i1, . . . , iK} is the index set of a coalition of K pirates, and XK =
{Xi : i ∈ K} are the fingerprints available to them. The collusion channel
produces the forgery Y ∈ Yn according to some conditional probability mass
function (pmf) pY|XK . The Boneh-Shaw marking assumption is imposed on
pY|XK , which allows the colluders to change only the symbols at the positions
where they find differences.
Not knowing the actual collusion channel pY|XK , the decoder
dn : Y × Vn → 2M (2.2)
produces an estimate Kˆ of the coalition. Note that the actual number of
pirates K is known neither to the encoder nor to the decoder, so the code
design is based on a nominal coalition size k. Also note that the empty set
∅ is an admissible decoder output, which enables us not to accuse any user
when no enough evidence is available to the decoder, especially when the
assumption that K is no more than k has been violated.
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2.2 Randomized Fingerprinting Codes
The formal definition of an ensemble of fingerprinting codes is as follows.
Definition 2.1. A fingerprinting ensemble (En, Dn) is formed by the finger-
printing embedder randomly choosing from a family {en(·, vn), dn(·, vn), vn ∈
Vn} of (n,m) fingerprinting codes according to some probability distribution
on the set Vn of keys.
We assume that the family of fingerprinting codes and the probability
distribution on Vn are known to the public, but the realization vn is only
known to the encoder and the decoder.
As shown in [4], it suffices for us to consider the following two-phase finger-
printing construction and joint/simple decoding scheme in studying capacity.
The secret key Vn shared by the encoder and the decoder in this scheme is
the set of random variables {Wj}nj=1 ∪ (Xi,j)m×n.
2.2.1 Encoding Scheme
Let PW be a probability distribution on the (q − 1)-dimensional simplex
W q ,
{
w ∈ Rq :
q−1∑
x=0
wx = 1 and 0 ≤ wx ≤ 1, x ∈ X
}
. (2.3)
A sequence of auxiliary “time-sharing” random variables 〈Wj〉nj=1 is drawn
independent and identically from the distribution PW. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
{Xi,j}mi=1 are m independent and identically distributed random variables
constructed from a categorical distribution with parameter Wj, i.e.,
Pr (X1,j = x1, . . . , Xm,j = xm|Wj = w) =
m∏
i=1
wxi , ∀x1, . . . , xm ∈ X .
(2.4)
In general, there is no constraint on the choice of the embedding distribu-
tion PW, which means that we can choose it from the class of all probability
distributions on W q, denoted by PW. However, we may want to limit PW
to a subclass Pe of PW in some applications. For instance, Nuida et al.
[7] limited PW to be discrete with a finite spectrum. Furon and Perez-Freire
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[14] utilized the arcsine and the uniform distribution for binary fingerprinting
codes, where Pe is just a singleton.
In most of our results we require Pe to be compact, which is true in
general.1 In some results we also require the following condition:
Condition 2.1. Pe is the class of all probability distributions on supp(Pe),
i.e.,
Pe = {PW ∈PW : supp(PW) ⊆ supp(Pe)} . (2.5)
Analogous to the symbol-symmetric fingerprinting codes proposed by Sˇkoric´
et al. [9], it is intuitively reasonable to adopt a probability distribution PW
that is invariant to permutations of the symbols. Formally, let pi be a per-
mutation of X and define
P piW(w0, . . . , wq−1) , PW(wpi(0), . . . , wpi(q−1)). (2.6)
Then we have
Definition 2.2. An embedding distribution PW is symbol-symmetric if
P piW = PW, ∀pi. (2.7)
Definition 2.3. A subset Pe of PW is said to be symbol-symmetric if
PW ∈Pe ⇒ P piW ∈Pe, ∀pi. (2.8)
Definition 2.4. The symbol-symmetric subclass of an embedding class Pe
is defined by
Pesym = {PW ∈Pe : PW is symbol-symmetric} . (2.9)
The optimality of limiting PW to Pesym will be discussed in the next chap-
ter.
2.2.2 Decoding Scheme
We briefly review Moulin’s two decoding schemes proposed in [4]: the sim-
ple decoder tests candidate fingerprints one by one, while the joint decoder
1Note, however, that the class of discrete probability distributions with finite spectrum
is not compact.
8
utilizes a joint decoding rule. The simple decoder evaluates the empirical
mutual information I(xi; y|w) for each user i. A threshold ηsimple is chosen
and user i is accused if and only if I(xi; y|w) > ηsimple. If I(xi; y|w) ≤ ηsimple
for all i ∈ M, then Kˆ = ∅. The joint decoder evaluates the following score
for each coalition A ⊆M
MPMI(A) =
{
0, if A = ∅
I(xA; y|w)− |A|ηjoint, otherwise
(2.10)
where ηjoint is a threshold. The set A that has the largest score is then
accused.
It is shown in [4] that the joint decoding scheme achieves capacity while the
simple decoding scheme has a smaller maximum achievable rate. However,
the joint decoder is generally computationally infeasible in practice. The
simple decoder, albeit suboptimal, is more practical.
2.3 Collusion Channel
Upon receiving the K fingerprinting copies {Xi1 , . . . ,XiK}, the pirates at-
tempt to generate a forgery Y subject to the marking assumption. A coor-
dinate j is called undetectable if
xi1,j = xi2,j = · · · = xiK ,j (2.11)
and is called detectable otherwise. The Boneh-Shaw marking assumption
states that for any forgery y generated by the coalition, we have yj = xi1,j
for every undetectable coordinate j.
We assume the collusion channel pY|XK adopted by the pirates is memo-
ryless, that is,
pY|XK(y|xK) =
n∏
j=1
pY |XK(yj|xK,j). (2.12)
As exploited in [4], the memoryless restriction can be relaxed without chang-
ing the fingerprinting capacity. For simplicity we impose this constraint so
the colluders’ strategy is limited to the choice of the single-lettered chan-
nel pY |XK . Denoted by Pmark, the class of attacks satisfying the marking
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assumption can be written as
Pmark = {pY |XK : pY |XK(y|xK) = 1 if y = xi1 = xi2 = · · · = xiK}. (2.13)
Several variations of the marking assumption appear in the literature. Sup-
pose Pc denotes the class of admissible channels pY |XK . Some restrict the
coalition to use only the symbols available to them, where Pc = {pY |XK ∈
Pmark : pY |XK(y|xK) = 0 if y 6= xi,∀i ∈ K} (generally called the restricted
digit model). Others relax the alphabet Y to X ∪ {‘?’}, which allows the
pirates to put erasures at detectable coordinates (generally called the gen-
eral digit model). Here we consider a general Pc with Pc ⊆ Pmark being
compact.
Given a single-lettered collusion channel pY |XK , consider the user-permuted
collusion channel
pY |Xpi(K)(y|xi1 , . . . , xiK ) , pY |XK(y|xpi(i1), . . . , xpi(iK)) (2.14)
where pi is a permutation of K. We say that pY |XK is user-symmetric if
pY |Xpi(K) = pY |XK , ∀pi. (2.15)
A subset Pc of Pmark is said to be user-symmetric if
pY |XK ∈Pc ⇒ pY |Xpi(K) ∈Pc, ∀pi. (2.16)
Note that in general not all elements of such Pc are user-symmetric.
The user-symmetric subclass of an collusion class Pc that consists of user-
symmetric collusion channels is defined by
Pcfair = {pY |XK ∈Pc : pY |XK is user-symmetric}. (2.17)
Symbol-symmetry can also be defined for collusion channels. Let pi be a
permutation of X and define
ppiY |XK(y|xi1 , . . . , xiK ) , pY |XK(y|pi(xi1), . . . , pi(xiK )). (2.18)
Then we have
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Definition 2.5. An collusion channel pY |XK is symbol-symmetric if
ppiY |XK = pY |XK , ∀pi. (2.19)
Definition 2.6. A subset Pc of Pmark is said to be symbol-symmetric if
pY |XK ∈Pc ⇒ ppiY |XK ∈Pc, ∀pi. (2.20)
Definition 2.7. The symbol-symmetric subclass of an collusion class Pc is
defined by
Pcsym =
{
pY |XK ∈Pc : pY |XK is symbol-symmetric
}
. (2.21)
2.4 Error Probabilities and Capacity
Under fingerprinting ensemble (En, Dn), nominal coalition size k (not nec-
essarily equal to the true coalition size K), and collusion channel pY |XK , we
consider the following error probabilities:
• The probability of false positives (accusing an innocent user):
PFPe (En, Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
Kˆ \ K 6= ∅
)
. (2.22)
• The probability of failing to catch any single pirate:
P onee (En, Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
Kˆ ∩ K = ∅
)
. (2.23)
• The probability of failing to catch the full coalition:
P alle (En, Dn, pY |XK) = Pr
(
K * Kˆ
)
. (2.24)
The error probabilities above can be written explicitly as
Pe(En, Dn, pY |XK) =
∑
xM,y
n∏
j=1
∫
PW(dwj)
(
m∏
i=1
wxi,j
)
pY |XK(yj|xK,j)1E
(2.25)
where the error event E is given by EFP = {dn(y, vn) \ K 6= ∅}, Eone =
{dn(y, vn) ∩ K = ∅}, and Eall = {K * dn(y, vn)}, when Pe is given by
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Equations (2.22), (2.23), and (2.24) respectively. The worst-case error
probability for a collusion class is given by
Pe,k(En, Dn,P
c) = max
K⊆M
|K|≤k
max
pY |XK∈Pc
Pe
(
En, Dn, pY |XK
)
. (2.26)
Having defined the error probabilities of the randomized fingerprinting
scheme, we now define the notion of capacity.
Definition 2.8. A rate R is achievable for embedding class Pe, collu-
sion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions under the detect-one criterion
if there exists a sequence of fingerprinting ensembles (Fn, Gn) generated
by PW ∈Pe for m = d2nRe users such that both PFPe,k (En, Dn,Pc) and
P onee,k (En, Dn,P
c) vanish as n goes to infinity.
Definition 2.9. A rate R is achievable for embedding class Pe, collu-
sion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions under the detect-all criterion
if there exists a sequence of fingerprinting ensembles (Fn, Gn) generated
by PW ∈Pe for m = d2nRe users such that both PFPe,k (En, Dn,Pc) and
P alle,k(En, Dn,P
c) vanish as n goes to infinity.
Definition 2.10. Fingerprinting capacities Conek (P
e,Pc) and
Callk (P
e,Pc) are the suprema of all achievable rates with respect to
the detect-one and detect-all criteria, respectively.
When the embedding class Pe is a singleton {PW} or the collusion
classPc is a singleton {pY |XK}, we denote the corresponding capacities
as Ck(PW, ·) and Ck(·, pY |XK) respectively, which is a slight abuse of
notation.
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Figure 2.1: Fingerprinting system model under the marking assumption
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CHAPTER 3
MUTUAL INFORMATION GAMES
In this chapter we first review the mutual information games associated with
both the joint and the simple decoding schemes in [4]. We show how these
games can be simplified under the marking assumption, and we present the
saddle-point property of the games.
3.1 Mutual Information Game of Joint Decoder
We use the special symbol K to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , k}, where k is the
nominal coalition size introduced in Section 2.1. To present the capacity
formula, we first introduce the following experiment: for a fixed embedding
class Pe, let
Pel , {pW ∈Pe : |supp(pW)| ≤ l} (3.1)
be the class of probability distributions with a finite spectrum composed of
no more than l points of the (q − 1)-dimensional simplex W q. A random
variable W is drawn from some pW ∈Pel , and {Xi}ki=1 are independent and
identically distributed with categorical distribution with parameter W, i.e.,
pXK|W(xK|w) =
k∏
i=1
pX|W(xi|w) (3.2)
where
pX|W(x|w) = wx, x ∈ X .
The collusion class Pc is the set of all feasible channels pY |XK . Let
C joint,lk (P
e,Pc) = max
pW∈Pel
min
pY |XK∈Pc
1
k
I(XK;Y |W). (3.3)
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The following theorem summarizes the main results of fingerprinting capacity
proposed in [4] under the marking assumption.
Theorem 3.1. For compact Pe and Pc, we have
1. Callk (P
e,Pc) ≤ Conek (Pe,Pc). In particular, the detect-all fingerprint-
ing capacity Callk (P
e,Pmark) under the marking assumption is zero.
2. Suppose further that Pc is user-symmetric, then
Conek (P
e,Pc) = Conek (P
e,Pcfair) = C
all
k (P
e,Pcfair) = lim
l→∞
C joint,lk (P
e,Pc).
Proof. See [4].
Now since the detect-all capacity is null under the marking assumption, we
will in the rest of the thesis refer to the detect-one capacity Conek (P
e,Pc),
denoted by C jointk (P
e,Pc), as the joint fingerprinting capacity for embedding
class Pe and collusion channel Pc.
In the game-theoretic point of view, C joint,lk is the maximin value of a two-
person zero-sum game for each l. Observe that the sequence 〈C joint,lk 〉∞l=1
is nondecreasing since 〈Pel 〉∞l=1 is nondecreasing. Thus the game can be
interpreted as the following: the maximizer, the fingerprint embedder, picks
pW with an increasing flexibility in the support size, while the minimizer, the
coalition, counters the embedder’s choice for each l by minimizing the mutual
information payoff function. Fingerprinting capacity is the limit value of the
sequence of maximin games.
However, the maximin game of Equation (3.3) is in general very difficult
to solve even for small values of l since a saddle-point solution cannot be
guaranteed. For the binary alphabet (q = 2) and l = 1, we can derive the
maximin value as
C joint,1k (PW,Pmark) =
1
k
2−(k−1) (3.4)
which is not achieved by a saddle-point solution when k > 2. Also, this is a
very loose lower bound on C jointk (PW,Pmark) for large k comparing to the
Θ(k−2) bound we will show in Section 4.3.
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3.2 Mutual Information Game of Simple Decoder
As mentioned in Section 2.2, computationally the joint decoding is too com-
plex. Thus it is also interesting to study the maximum achievable rate of the
simple decoding scheme.
Theorem 3.2. For compact Pe and compact and user-symmetric Pc, let
Csimple,lk (P
e,Pc) = max
pW∈Pel
min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
I(X1;Y |W) (3.5)
for l ≥ 1 and let
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) = lim
l→∞
Csimple,lk (P
e,Pc). (3.6)
Then all rates below Csimplek (P
e,Pc) are achievable by the simple decoding
scheme for embedding class Pe, collusion channel Pc, and size-k coalitions
under the detect-one criterion.
Corollary 3.3. For compact Pe and compact and user-symmetric Pc, we
have
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) ≤ C jointk (Pe,Pc). (3.7)
Proof. See [4].
Although we do not have a notion of capacity for the quantity Csimplek , it
will be referred to as the “simple” fingerprinting capacity as opposed to the
joint fingerprinting discussed in the previous section.
3.3 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games of Fingerprinting
Capacity
To establish the desired saddle-point property, we first reformulate both the
joint and the simple fingerprinting capacities as the respective values of the
following two fingerprinting maximin games.
Theorem 3.4. For compact Pe and compact and user-symmetric Pc, we
have
C jointk (P
e,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |XK∈Pc
1
k
I(XK;Y |W) (3.8)
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and
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
I(X1;Y |W). (3.9)
Proof. Let
I jointk (w, pY |XK) =
1
k
IpY |XK (XK;Y |W = w) (3.10)
and let
Isimplek (w, pY |XK) = IpY |XK (X1;Y |W = w). (3.11)
Then the payoff functions of Equations (3.8) and (3.9) become
EPW
[
I jointk (W, pY |XK)
]
and EPW
[
Isimplek (W, pY |XK)
]
respectively. Denote
also the right-hand sides of Equations (3.8) and (3.9) by C˜ jointk (P
e,Pc) and
C˜simplek (P
e,Pc) respectively. The inequality
Ck(P
e,Pc) ≤ C˜k(Pe,Pc) (3.12)
follows directly from the fact thatPel ⊆Pe for each l. Now let the optimum
achieving distributions for Equation (3.8) or (3.9) be P ∗W and p
∗
Y |XK . Then
by compactness of Pe, there exists a sequence of distributions 〈plW〉∞l=1 with
plW ∈ Pel that converges in distribution to P ∗W. Both the functions I jointk
and Isimplek are bounded and continuous with respect to w. By [15, p.249
Theorem 1] we have
lim
l→∞
EplW
[
Ik(W, p
∗
Y |XK)
]
= EP ∗W
[
Ik(W, p
∗
Y |XK)
]
(3.13)
and thus
Ck(P
e,Pc) ≥ lim
l→∞
EplW
[
Ik(W, p
∗
Y |XK)
]
= C˜k(P
e,Pc). (3.14)
Combining (3.12) and (3.14) yields Equations (3.8) and (3.9).
Theorem 3.4 shows that the joint and simple capacities are the maximin
values of two single two-person zero-sum games. In the following we further
show that the maximin and minimax values of the games are equal in general,
and there are always saddle-point strategies for both players of the games.
We define the following values associated the above games:
Definition 3.5. The maximin value of the joint fingerprinting game is de-
17
fined by
C jointk (P
e,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |XK∈Pc
EPW
[
I jointk (W, pY |XK)
]
. (3.15)
Definition 3.6. The maximin value of the simple fingerprinting game is
defined by
Csimplek (P
e,Pc) = max
PW∈Pe
min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
EPW
[
Isimplek (W, pY |XK)
]
. (3.16)
Definition 3.7. The minimax value of the joint fingerprinting game is de-
fined by
C
joint
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pc
max
PW∈Pe
EPW
[
I jointk (W, pY |XK)
]
. (3.17)
Definition 3.8. The minimax value of the simple fingerprinting game is
defined by
C
simple
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
max
PW∈Pe
EPW
[
Isimplek (W, pY |XK)
]
. (3.18)
When Condition 2.1 is satisfied (for example, when Pe = PW), the min-
imax games can be simplified as the following:
Lemma 3.9. Assume that Condition 2.1 is satisfied. Then the minimax
values of the joint or simple fingerprinting games can be written as
C
joint
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pc
max
w∈supp(Pe)
I jointk (w, pY |XK) (3.19)
and
C
simple
k (P
e,Pc) = min
pY |XK∈Pcfair
max
w∈supp(Pe)
Isimplek (w, pY |XK). (3.20)
Proof. Note that randomization is no longer necessary for the minimax games
of Equations (3.17) and (3.18), so they have the same respective values as
Equations (3.19) and (3.20).
We now present the main saddle-point property of the fingerprinting games.
The results owe to the convexity of the payoff function with respect to the
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minimizer’s strategy. Such games are generally called the class of convex
games [16, §2.5].
Theorem 3.10. For compact Pe, compact and user-symmetric Pc, and
for both the joint and simple games, Ck(Pe,Pc) = Ck(P
e,Pc). Suppose
further that Pe and Pc are symbol-symmetric, then the first argument Pe
can be replaced by Pesym and/or the second argument P
c can be replaced by
Pcfair, P
c
sym, orP
c
fair,sym without changing the minimax or the maximin value.
For all these games, the minimizer has an optimal strategy p
(k)
Y |XK ∈Pcfair,sym
while the maximizer has an optimal strategy P
(k)
W ∈ Pesym. In particular,
when Condition 2.1 is satisfied, the maximizing strategy p
(k)
W ∈ Pesym has a
finite spectrum. The values of all these games equal the (joint or simple)
fingerprinting capacity Ck(Pe,Pc).
Proof. We show that the functions I jointk and I
simple
k are convex functions of
pY |XK for fixed w. The convexity of I
joint
k is shown in [17, Theorem 2.7.4]. To
show the convexity of Isimplek (w, pY |XK), we fix w and consider two different
conditional distributions p1Y |XK and p
2
Y |XK . Note that
Isimplek (w, pY |XK) = I(X1;Y |W = w)
=
∑
x,y
pX1|W(x|w)pY |X1W(y|x,w) log
pY |X1W(y|x,w)
pY |W(y|w)
=
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)D(pY |X1W ‖ pY |W|W = w). (3.21)
For any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have
λIsimple(w, p1Y |XK) + (1− λ)Isimple(w, p2Y |XK)
=
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)
[
λD(p1Y |X1W ‖ p1Y |W|W = w)
+(1− λ)D(p2Y |X1W ‖ p2Y |W|W = w)
]
≥
∑
x
pX1|W(x|w)D(pλY |X1W ‖ pλY |W|W = w)
= Isimple(w, pλY |XK) (3.22)
where pλY |XK = λp
1
Y |XK + (1− λ)p2Y |XK ∈Pc by compactness. The inequality
follows from the convexity of relative entropy [17, Theorem 2.7.2]. Hence
Isimplek is convex in pY |XK .
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Now since Ik(w, pY |XK) is a convex function of pY |XK for fixed w ∈ W q,
EPW [Ik(W, pY |XK)] is also a convex function of pY |XK for fixed PW ∈PW. On
the other hand, EPW [Ik(W, pY |XK)] is a linear function of PW for fixed pY |XK .
By the minimax theorem [18], the game admits a saddle-point solution.
IfPe is symbol-symmetric and let PW be a minimizing saddle-point strat-
egy, then by symbol-symmetry each P piW ∈ Pe is a minimizing saddle-point
strategy for any permutation pi of X . The symbol-permutation averaged
distribution
PW =
1
q!
∑
pi
P piW (3.23)
is also a minimizing saddle-point strategy and is symbol-symmetric by con-
struction. Similarly if Pc is user-symmetric and symbol-symmetric, we can
construct a maximizing saddle-point strategy that is both user-symmetric
and symbol-symmetric.
Finally if Pe is the class of all probability distributions on supp(Pe)
(Condition 2.1), the game becomes a so-called convex game whose minimizing
strategy has a finite spectrum (see [16, §2.5]).
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CHAPTER 4
FINGERPRINTING CAPACITY FOR THE
BINARY ALPHABET
In this chapter we study intensively the joint and simple fingerprinting games
for the binary alphabets. Tight upper and lower bounds on capacities are
provided under several different setups. Using the asymptotic methods we
show the optimality of the arcsine distribution and the interleaving attack
for large coalitions.
4.1 Game Definition
The mutual information games of joint and simple decoder in the binary case
can be simplified as follows:
1. Fingerprinting Codes
Let X = Y = {0, 1}1. The auxiliary random vector W now has only
one degree of freedom, and we redefine it as W ∈ [0, 1]. PW denotes its
distribution and pX|W ∼ Bernoulli(W ).
By Theorem 3.10, it suffices to consider (symbol-)symmetric PW , which
in the binary case means that the distribution of W is symmetric about
1/2, i.e.,
Pr(W ≤ w) = Pr(W ≥ 1− w), w ∈ [0, 1]. (4.1)
We consider a subset of the family of beta distributions, which is a
family of continuous probability distributions defined on (0, 1) param-
eterized by θ. The pdf of the Beta(θ, θ) is defined by
fW (w) =
1
B(θ, θ)
[w(1− w)]θ−1 (4.2)
1In the case of the binary alphabet, the four variations of the marking assumption
discussed in [9] are equivalent in terms of capacity. Hence for simplicity we assume X = Y.
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where the beta function, B(θ, θ) ,
∫ 1
0
[t(1− t)]θ−1 dt, appears as a
normalization constant. The arcsine distribution, which is a special
case of the beta distribution with θ = 1/2, has cdf
P ∗W (w) =
2
pi
arcsin(
√
w) (4.3)
for 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and has pdf
f ∗W (w) =
1
pi
√
w(1− w) (4.4)
on (0, 1). The arcsine distribution was first used in generating random-
ized fingerprinting codes in [6].
2. Collusion Channel
SupposePc is user-symmetric; then by Theorem 3.10 it suffices to con-
sider user-symmetric attacks. Let Z ,
∑k
i=1Xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, which
is the number of 1’s in XK. User-symmetry makes Z a sufficient statis-
tic in producing Y . Let p = (p0, . . . , pk)
′, where pz , pY |Z(1|z), z =
0, . . . , k. The marking assumption enforces that
p0 = 0 and pk = 1. (4.5)
On the other hand, symbol-symmetry allows us to consider p with
pz = 1− pk−z, z = 0, . . . , k. (4.6)
The interleaving attack p∗ (a.k.a. “uniform channel” in [12] and “blind
colluders” in [19]) defined by
p∗z =
z
k
, z = 0, . . . , k (4.7)
is frequently adopted to model the coalition’s behavior. One can easily
verify that it satisfies the marking assumption (4.5) and is both user-
and symbol-symmetric (4.1). We will further discuss the performance
of this attack in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
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3. Payoff Functions
Let α(w) = (α0(w), . . . , αk(w))
′ and similarily for α1(w) and α0(w)
where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z, (4.8)
α1z(w) , pZ|X1W (z|1, w) =
{ (
k−1
z−1
)
wz−1(1− w)k−z, 1 ≤ z ≤ k;
0, z = 0,
(4.9)
and
α0z(w) , pZ|X1W (z|0, w) =
{ (
k−1
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z−1, 0 ≤ z ≤ k − 1;
0, z = k.
(4.10)
Recall that W → XK → Z → Y forms a Markov chain. We have
pY |X1W (1|x,w) =
k∑
z=0
pZ|X1W (z|x,w)pY |Z(1|z)
=
k∑
z=0
αxz (w)pz = α
x′p (4.11)
for x = 0, 1. The payoff function of the joint fingerprinting game is
then
I jointk (w,p) =
1
k
I(XK;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
I(Z;Y |W = w)
=
1
k
[H(Y |W = w)−H(Y |Z,W = w)]
=
1
k
[
h
(
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz
)
−
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h(pz)
]
=
1
k
[h(α′p)−α′h(p)] . (4.12)
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Another representation of I jointk is
I jointk (w,p) =
1
k
D(pZY |W ‖ pZ|WpY |W |W = w)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
1∑
y=0
pZ|W (z|w)pY |Z(y|z) log
pY |Z(y|z)
pY |W (y|w)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w)
[
pz log
pz
α′p
+ (1− pz) log 1− pz
1−α′p
]
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d(pz ‖ α′p). (4.13)
For the simple fingerprinting game, we have
Isimplek (w,p) = I(X1;Y |W = w)
= D(pX1Y |W ‖ pX1|WpY |W |W = w)
=
1∑
x=0
1∑
y=0
pX1|W (x|w)pY |X1W (y|x,w) log
pY |X1W (y|x,w)
pY |W (y|w)
= wD(pY |X1=1,W ‖ pY |W ) + (1− w)D(pY |X1=0,W ‖ pY |W )
(a)
= wd2(α
1′p ‖ α′p) + (1− w)d2(α0′p ‖ α′p) (4.14)
where (a) follows from Equation (4.11).
4. Fingerprinting Games
The fingerprinting game for the binary alphabet under the marking
assumption can then be written as
Ck(P
e,Pc) = max
PW
min
p
EPW [Ik(W,p)] (4.15)
= min
p
max
PW
EPW [Ik(W,p)] (4.16)
where the maximization is subject to PW ∈ Pe and the symbol-
symmetry condition (4.1) while the minimization is subject to p ∈Pc
and the symbol-symmetry condition (4.6). The maximizing and min-
imizing strategies are denoted by P
(k)
W and p
(k) respectively. Assume
that Condition 2.1 is satisfied; then by Lemma 3.9 we have
Ck(P
e,Pc) = min
p
max
w
Ik(w,p) (4.17)
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where the maximization is subject to w ∈ supp(Pe).
4.2 Analysis of the Convex Games
We consider the following three cases:
1. Colluders’ Strategy is Fixed
Pc = {p} in this case. For general Pe the game is still an infinite-
dimensional maximization problem. However when Condition 2.1 is
satisfied, it reduces to one-dimensional by (4.17) and a simple line
search gives us the capacity under collusion channel p. Note that for
any p ∈Pmark, Ck(Pe,p) is an upper bound on Ck(Pe,Pmark).
2. Fingerprinting Embedder’s Strategy is Fixed
Pe = {PW} in this case. The game reduces to a Θ(k)-dimentional min-
imization problem. Since the payoff function EPW [Ik(W,p)] is convex
in p, we use the conditional gradient method to solve the constrained
convex optimization problem (4.15) (see [20]). For the joint finger-
printing game, Furon and Perez-Freire [21] proposed a Blahut-Arimoto
algorithm which, however, cannot be applied to the simple fingerprint-
ing game. Note that for any PW ∈PW , Ck(PW ,Pe) is a lower bound
on Ck(PW ,Pe).
3. Fingerprinting Capacities Under the Marking Assumption
We consider specifically Pe = PW and Pc = Pmark. Solving the
maximin game of (4.15) or the minimax game of (4.17) is much more
difficult than solving the above maximization or minimization prob-
lems. In particular, the alternating maximization and minimization
algorithm generally diverges.
Owing to the existence of a saddle-point solution, p(k) and p
(k)
W (note
that it is a pmf by Theorem 3.10) must satisfy the following:
(a) When p = p(k) is fixed, I(w,p(k)) is a differentiable function over
the unit interval. Supp
(
p
(k)
W
)
can only take values at the maxi-
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mizers of I(w,p(k)) [16, §2.5]. Hence we have
I(w,p(k)) = Ck(PW ,Pmark)
∂
∂w
I(w,p(k)) = 0
∂2
∂w2
I(w,p(k)) < 0
, ∀w ∈ supp
(
p
(k)
W
)
. (4.18)
(b) When pW = p
(k)
W is fixed and the constraint (4.6) is imposed, we
have
E
p
(k)
W
[
∂
∂pz
I(W,p(k))
]
= 0, z = 1, . . . ,
⌊
k − 1
2
⌋
. (4.19)
By the convexity in p of the payoff function, we have
∣∣∣supp(p(k)W )∣∣∣ ≤⌊
k+1
2
⌋
(see [16, §2.5]). With a fixed spectrum cardinality, we can ob-
tain candidate capacity-achieving strategies p
(k)
W and p
(k) by solving
Equations (4.18) and (4.19), and then verify whether those candidate
distributions are optimal by examining the second partial derivatives.
Once p(k) and p
(k)
W are found, we can evaluate Ck(PW ,Pmark) by sub-
stituting them into (4.15).
Numerical solutions to the joint and simple fingerprinting games are shown
in Figures 4.1-4.6.
4.3 Capacity Bounds
The analysis of Section 4.2 allows us to solve the fingerprinting game numer-
ically for small k. However, evaluating or even approximating the capacity
value for large k is still a difficult task. In this section, we provide tight upper
and lower bounds on capacity.
For simplicity of notation, we let
gk(w) , pY |W (1|w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz = α(w)
′p (4.20)
which by the definition of αz(w) in (4.8) is a polynomial in w of degree ≤ k.
Note that gk(0) = p0 = 0 and gk(1) = pk = 1 by the marking assumption.
The following lemmas will be useful for the proofs:
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Lemma 4.1 (Pinsker’s inequality). [17, Lemma 11.6.1]
d(r ‖ s) ≥ 2
ln 2
(r − s)2. (4.21)
Lemma 4.2. Equalities
α1
′
p−α′p = 1− w
k
g′k(w)
and
α0
′
p−α′p = −w
k
g′k(w)
hold for z = 0, . . . , k and w ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The equalities follow directly from Equations (4.8), (4.9), (4.10), and
(4.20).
Lemma 4.3. Let fW be a pdf on [0, 1], then∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w) ≥ pi
2 (4.22)
with equality if and only if fW is the arcsine distribution of (4.4).
Proof. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have
∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w) ≥
[∫ 1
0
dw√
w(1− w)
]2
∫ 1
0
fW (w)dw
= pi2.
Equality holds if and only if fW (w) ∝ 1√
w(1−w) , which leads us to the arcsine
distribution.
4.3.1 Upper Bounds
The following two theorems upper bound capacities under the interleaving
attack of (4.7).
Theorem 4.4. [22, Theorem 4.2]
C jointk (PW ,p
∗) ≤ 1
k2 ln 2
. (4.23)
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Proof.
C jointk (PW ,p
∗) = max
w∈[0,1]
I jointk (w,p
∗)
=
1
k
max
w∈[0,1]
{
h(w)−
k∑
z=0
αz(w)h
(z
k
)}
≤ 1
k2 ln 2
where the last inequality results from [12, Theorem 4.3].
Theorem 4.5. [22, Proposition 4.2]
Csimplek (PW ,p
∗) = 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2k
)
=
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
. (4.24)
Proof. It can be shown that Isimplek (w,p
∗) takes its maximum at w = 1/2.
Hence
Csimplek (PW ,p
∗) = max
w∈[0,1]
Isimplek (w,p
∞)
= 1− h
(
1
2
+
1
2k
)
=
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
.
4.3.2 Lower Bounds
The following theorem provides a lower bound on both the joint and simple
capacities under a continuous probability distribution fW .
Theorem 4.6. Let fW be the pdf of a continuous probability distribution on
[0, 1], then
C jointk (fW ,Pmark) ≥ Csimplek (fW ,Pmark) ≥
2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
.
(4.25)
The lower bound is maximized when fW = f
∗
W at which it takes the value
2
k2pi2 ln 2
.
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Proof. For any p ∈Pmark, we have
EfW
[
Isimplek (W,p)
]
(a)
=
∫ 1
0
[
wd(α1
′
p ‖ α′p) + (1− w)d(α0′p ‖ α′p)
]
fW (w)dw
(b)
≥ 2
ln 2
∫ 1
0
[
w(α1
′
p−α′p)2 + (1− w)(α0′p−α′p)2
]
fW (w)dw
(c)
=
2
k2 ln 2
∫ 1
0
[g′k(w)]
2
w(1− w)fW (w)dw
(d)
≥ 2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
g′k(w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
(e)
=
2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
.
(a) follows from (4.14). (b) follows from Pinsker’s inequality (Lemma 4.1).
(c) follows from Lemma 4.2. (d) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Finally, (e) follows from the marking assumption. Hence
Csimplek (fW ,Pmark) = min
p∈Pmark
EfW
[
Isimplek (W,p)
]
≥ 2
k2 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
.
Following Lemma 4.3, the lower bound is maximized when fW = f
∗
W , which
coincides with the lower bound given in [22].
The following corollaries summarizes the upper and lower bounds on ca-
pacities under the marking assumption:
Corollary 4.7.
2
k2pi2 ln 2
≤ C jointk (PW ,Pmark) ≤
1
k2 ln 2
. (4.26)
Corollary 4.8.
2
k2pi2 ln 2
≤ Csimplek (PW ,Pmark) ≤
1
k22 ln 2
+O
(
1
k4
)
. (4.27)
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4.4 Asymptotic Behavior for Large Coalitions
The upper and lower bounds on C jointk (PW ,Pmark) provided in the previous
section are within a factor of about five. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, the
numerical results suggest that C jointk (PW ,Pmark) approximates
1
k22 ln 2
even
for small values of k. Amiri and Tardos [11] claimed the same asymptotic
rate without providing a proof. Here we analyze not only this rate but the
complete asymptotic behavior of the joint fingerprinting game.
We consider the sequence of mutual information games of joint decoding.
To approximate the asymptotic behavior when k →∞, we first assume that
the collusion channel p satisfies the following condition:
Condition 4.1. There exists a bounded and twice differentiable function
g(w) on [0, 1] with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1 such that
pz = g
(z
k
)
, ∀z ∈ {0, . . . , k}. (4.28)
Certainly the condition restricts the colluders’ strategy to a smaller space.
We however claim that this is a very mild limitation on their power for the
following reasons:
1. Figure 4.5, 4.10-4.12 show the minimizing collusion channels p(k) for
several different embedding distributions. For each case it seems the
continuous interpolation of p converges to some g on [0, 1]. Indeed, our
following analysis should hold if we relax the restriction of (4.28) to
pz = g
(z
k
)
+ o
(
1
k
)
, ∀z ∈ {0, . . . , k}. (4.29)
2. It can be verified that the cardinality of both the original collusion class
(satisfying the marking assumption) and the restricted class satisfying
Condition 4.1 equal the cardinality of the continuum. So intuitively
the space of feasible collusion attacks is still large.
The following definition used in [23] will simplify our analysis:
Definition 4.9. Let G and J be functions on [0, 1] defined as
G(w) , cos−1[1− 2g(w)] (4.30)
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and
J(w) , w(1− w)[G′(w)]2 (4.31)
where g(w) satisfies Condition 4.1.
The outline of our asymptotic analysis is as follows: we fix w ∈ (0, 1)
and we study the asymptotic behavior of I jointk (w,p). Random variable Z
can be approximated by the Gaussian distribution with mean kw and vari-
ance kw(1 − w), and by which we can approximate the dominating terms
of I jointk (w,p). After some simplification we can find that I
joint
k (w,p) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
J(w), where J is a sole function of g defined in Equations (4.30)
and (4.31). The minimax game with J as the payoff function can be solved
explicitly and hence the asymptotic behavior of the fingerprinting game can
be obtained.
The following lemmas will be useful for our analysis:
Lemma 4.10. [24, Section 2.5]
d(r ‖ s) = (r − s)
2
2 ln 2s(1− s) +O(|r − s|
3). (4.32)
Lemma 4.11. For any δ > 0, we have
PZ|W=w[|Z − kw| ≥ kδ] ≤ e−2kδ2 .
Proof. This is special case of Hoeffding’s inequality (see [25]).
Lemma 4.12 (de Moivre-Laplace Theorem). For fixed w ∈ (0, 1), γ < 2
3
,
we have
αz(w) ∼ 1√
2pikw(1− w) exp
[
− (z − kw)
2
2kw(1− w)
]
for all values of z satisfying the inequality
|z − kw| ≤ kγ.
Recall that the expectation of Y given W = w, which we denote by gk(w)
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in (4.20), can be written as
gk(w) , pY |W (1|w) =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)pz =
k∑
z=0
αz(w)g
(z
k
)
where
αz(w) , pZ|W (z|w) =
(
k
z
)
wz(1− w)k−z
is the binomial pmf which concentrates around its mean kw as k →∞. gk is
a polynomial in w of degree ≤ k and is known as the Bernstein polynomial
of order k of the function g [26]. Since by Condition 4.1 g is bounded and
the second derivative g′′(w) exists, from Bernstein [26, §1.6] we have
gk(w) = g(w) +
w(1− w)
2k
g′′(w) + o
(
1
k
)
. (4.33)
On the other hand, for z = k(w + ), we have
pz = g
(z
k
)
= g(w + )
= g(w) + g′(w) +O
(
2
)
. (4.34)
We now write the asymptotic approximation of I jointk in terms of g.
Firstly by the bounds presented in Section 4.3, we can focus on w and g
such that I jointk (w) = Ω
(
1
k2
)
. Let δ =
√
ln k
k
. We have
I jointk (w,p)
(a)
=
1
k
k∑
z=0
αz(w) d(pz ‖ gk(w))
(b)∼ 1
k
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w) d(pz ‖ gk(w)) (4.35)
where (a) follows from (4.13) and (4.20) and (b) follows from Lemma 4.11 as
PZ|W=w[|Z − kw| ≥ kδ] ≤ 1
k2
.
Now if we let z = kw + η, where η = O(
√
k ln k), then by (4.34) we have
pz = g(w) +
η
k
g′(w) +O
(
η2
k2
)
(4.36)
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and combining (4.33) we have
pz − gk(w) = η
k
g′(w) +O
(
ln k
k
)
. (4.37)
Note that this is not true for η = O(1), but that is just a finite number of
terms whose contribution to (4.35) decays exponentially.
Using the result of (4.37) and by Lemma 4.10, we have
d(pz ‖ gk(w)) = [pz − gk(w)]
2
2 ln 2gk(w)(1− gk(w)) + o
(
1
k
)
(4.38)
and we can write (4.35) as
I jointk (w,p)
∼ 1
k2 ln 2
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w)
[pz − gk(w)]2
gk(w)(1− gk(w))
(a)∼ 1
k2 ln 2g(w)(1− g(w))
∑
z:|z−kw|<kδ
αz(w) [pz − gk(w)]2
(b)∼ 1
k2 ln 2g(w)(1− g(w))
∑
|η|<kδ
1√
2pikw(1− w) exp
[
− η
2
2kw(1− w)
] [η
k
g′(w)
]2
=
[g′(w)]2
k32 ln 2g(w)(1− g(w))
∑
|η|<kδ
1√
2pikw(1− w) exp
[
− η
2
2kw(1− w)
]
η2 (4.39)
where (a) follows from (4.33) and (b) follows from Lemma 4.12 and (4.37).
To approximate the summation, we use Laplace’s method for sums [27]:
∑
|η|<kδ
1√
2pikw(1− w) exp
[
− η
2
2kw(1− w)
]
η2
∼
∫ kδ
η=−kδ
1√
2pikw(1− w) exp
[
− η
2
2kw(1− w)
]
η2dη
= kw(1− w)
∫ √ ln k
w(1−w)
λ=−
√
ln k
w(1−w)
1√
2pi
exp
[
−λ
2
2
]
λ2dλ
∼ kw(1− w)
∫ ∞
λ=−∞
1√
2pi
exp
[
−λ
2
2
]
λ2dλ
= kw(1− w). (4.40)
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Hence we get
I jointk (w,p) ∼
[g′(w)]2w(1− w)
k22 ln 2g(w)(1− g(w)) =
1
k22 ln 2
J(w) (4.41)
where the last equality follows directly from the definitions in (4.30) and
(4.31). The following theorem concludes what we have proved thus far:
Theorem 4.13. Assume that Condition 4.1 is satisfied, then
I jointk (w,p) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
J(w), ∀w ∈ (0, 1). (4.42)
The joint fingerprinting game can now be approximated by the game with
J as its payoff function. We consider continuous probability distributions fW
satisfying the following condition:
Condition 4.2. fW is the pdf of a continuous probability distribution on
[0, 1] with ∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w) <∞. (4.43)
The following lemma shows the solution to the minimization problem with
J as its payoff fuction:
Lemma 4.14. Let g(w) satisfy Condition 4.1 and fix fW satisfying Condition
4.2. Then
min
g
EfW [J(W )] = min
g
∫ 1
0
J(w)fW (w)dw = pi
2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
(4.44)
where J is defined in (4.30) and (4.31). The minimum is achieved when
gopt(w) =
1
2
1− cos
pi
∫ w
0
dv
fW (v)v(1− v)∫ 1
0
dv
fW (v)v(1− v)

 . (4.45)
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Proof. We have∫
J(w)fW (w)dw =
∫ 1
0
w(1− w)[G′(w)]2fW (w)dw
(a)
≥
[∫ 1
0
G′(w)dw
]2
∫ 1
0
dw
w(1− w)fW (w)
(b)
= pi2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
(4.46)
where (a) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (b) follows from
the boundary conditions G(0) = 0 and G(1) = pi following directly from
Condition 4.1 and the definition of (4.30). Equality of (a) holds when
G′opt(w) =
pi∫ 1
0
dv
fW (v)v(1− v)
· 1
fW (w)w(1− w) , (4.47)
which leads us to (4.45) by (4.30) and (4.31).
Corollary 4.15. For fW satisfying Condition 4.2,
C jointk (fW ,Pmark) ∼
pi2
k22 ln 2
[∫ 1
0
dw
fW (w)w(1− w)
]−1
. (4.48)
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 4.13 and Lemma 4.14.
Corollary 4.16.
C jointk (f
∗
W ,Pmark) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
. (4.49)
Proof. The right-hand side of Equation 4.48 is maximized when fW = f
∗
W by
Lemma 4.3. Also note that by Equation (4.45) we have gopt(w) = w, which
leads us to the interleaving attack.
Corollary 4.17.
I jointk (w,p
∗) ∼ 1
k22 ln 2
, ∀w ∈ (0, 1). (4.50)
Proof. Let g(w) = w. p becomes the interleaving attack by Condition 4.1
and J(w) ≡ 1.
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Corollary 4.18. The fingerprinting capacity under the marking assumption
satisfies
C jointk (PW ,Pmark) ∼
1
k22 ln 2
. (4.51)
Furthermore, the arcsine distribution f ∗W and the interleaving attack p
∗ are
the respective maximizing and minimizing strategies that achieve the asymp-
totic capacity value.
Proof. Asymptotic relations (4.49) and (4.50) set the lower and upper bound
on C jointk (PW ,Pmark) respectively.
We now use the family of Beta distributions to illustrate the asymptotic
behavior of the joint fingerprinting game. Let f θW be the pdf of the Beta(θ, θ)
defined in (4.2). Condition 4.2 is satisfied for θ ∈ (0, 1). For θ = 1/2, 1/3,
and 2/3, we find the minimizing collusion channels p(k) for f θW and compare
them with gopt(z/k) obtained by Equation (4.45). Figures 4.7-4.9 show that
p
(k)
z does converge to gopt(z/k) as k goes to infinity as expected, which also
rationalizes our assumption of Condition 4.1.
Suppose now we consider the normalized payoff function
I˜ jointk (w,p) , k22 ln 2 · I jointk (w,p) (4.52)
which by Theorem 4.13 should be asymptotically close to J(w). Suppose Jopt
is obtained by substituting gopt of Equation (4.45) into Equations (4.30) and
(4.31). Again for θ = 1/2, 1/3, and 2/3, we compare I˜ jointk (w,p) with Jopt(w)
in Figure 4.10-4.12. As shown in the figures, I jointk (w,p) is asymptotically
flat over (0, 1) when θ = 1/2, which is the case when f θW is chosen properly.
If θ < 1/2, which means f θW has too much weight around 0 and 1, then the
colluders’ choice of gopt makes Jopt peak at w = 1/2. If on the contrary
θ > 1/2, then too much weight around 1/2 is put on f θW , and gopt makes Jopt
peaks at w = 0, 1.
4.5 Why Are the Arcsine Distribution and the
Interleaving Attack Optimal for Large Coalitions?
In 2003, the arcsine distribution was first applied to the applications of fin-
gerprinting by Tardos [6]. How he fine-tuned his codes, however, had been a
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mystery until Furon et al. [19] rationalized Tardos’ choices based on Gaussian
approximations. On the other hand, the interleaving attack has been fre-
quently adopted to model the collusion channel in the literature [12, 19, 21],
but no conceptual reasoning has been proposed on why it should be the
coalition’s optimal choice. Fortunately, thanks to the discovery of the capac-
ity formula (Theorem 3.4), we can now study fingerprinting games from the
information-theoretic point of view. In the previous section, the optimality
of these two strategies is established based on asymptotic methods. In this
section we give a higher level justification from the standpoint of statistical
decision theory.
We may think of the (joint) fingerprinting game as follows: the coali-
tion is given k independent observations X1, . . . , Xk distributed according
to an unknown distribution Bernoulli(W ) chosen at random by the finger-
printing embedder from the set {Bernoulli(W ) : W ∈ [0, 1]} according to a
known prior distribution PW . Upon generating Y according to Bernoulli(pZ)
based on the sufficient statistic Z =
∑k
i=1Xi, the coalition suffers a loss
I(XK;Y |W = w). The risk of the game is the average loss under PW .
As emphasized in previous works [4, 21], the choice of the embedding
distribution PW , or prior selection in statistician’s language, is crucial to the
fingerprinting game. If no randomization takes place [3], or equivalently, if
the realization w is revealed to the pirates [21], then the maximin game value
decays exponentially with coalition size k (see (3.4)). Loosely speaking, the
loss the pirates suffer is due to their error in estimating W . If they have a
good estimation of the time-sharing random variable W , then the loss they
suffer is small.
Jeffreys’ prior [28] is a “non-informative” prior that is central to the study
of Bayesian analysis. Given a family of distributions with an unknown pa-
rameter, the Jeffreys’ prior is proportional to the square root of the Fisher in-
formation. Conceptually speaking, the Jeffreys’ prior is the “least-favorable”
distribution in regard to estimating that parameter. For the Bernoulli trial
with the probability of success w as parameter, the Fisher information is
I(w) = [w(1− w)]−1 and thus the Jeffreys’ prior is
f(w) ∝ 1√
w(1− w) (4.53)
which is exactly the arcsine distribution! The pdf is U-shaped, which suggests
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that W is easier to estimate around 1/2 than close to 0 and 1. The selection
of Jeffreys’ prior equalizes such difficulty discrepancy.
Optimality of the interleaving attack is probably easier to understand.
From Corollary 4.17 it is the asymptotic equalizing strategy. Another inter-
pretation is that the interleaving attack is the strategy where the colluders
generate Y according to Bernoulli(Wˆ ), where Wˆ =
Z
k
is the maximum like-
lihood estimator, which is asymptotically unbiased (as k → ∞) and has
minimum asymptotic variance (equal to (kI(w))−1 = w(1− w)/k).
4.6 Figures
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY
In this work, we prove new upper and lower bounds on the maximum achiev-
able rate of binary fingerprinting codes for arbitrary coalition size by study-
ing the minimax and the maximin fingerprinting games. We also provide
asymptotic approximations of the capacity as well as both the fingerprinting
embedder and the coalition’s strategies. The results suggest that fingerprint-
ing games under the Boneh-Shaw marking assumption have a close relation
to the Fisher information and the Jeffreys’ prior for the Bernoulli model.
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